On 24th September 1996, at UN headquarters in New York, 65
countries including declared five nuclear powers, the United States,
China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom signed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as commitment to step nuclear test explosions.
The significance of this treaty is that it prevents any further
significant development of nuclear weapons states and the so called
threshold states, Pakistan, India and Israel. But it is also a tremendous step
forward in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear
testing been looked upon the most of the world as underscoring the
discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime, which allowed the
nuclear weapon states to retain their weapons and to continue to improve
them while the rest of the world was precluded by the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) from engaging in any nuclear weapon programme.
the Trinity test the first nuclear test in history. Almost immediately,
On 16th July 1945 CTBT began in the deserts of New Mexico with scientists and others began discussing banning further tests of nuclear
weapons. The last two and a half years of test ban negotiation have been
particularly excruciating as they have had to go through the 38 nations
Conference on Disarmament (CD). In January 1994, the CD took up
a long
concluding
negotiations of a Comprehensive test ban treaty, and it has been
difficult process. There was substantial opposition in the CD to
the comprehensive test ban. The pace was largely set by the nuclear
weapon states, many of which opposed the test ban.
At the same time it was fighting off obstacles at the CD, the
administration had to conduct rear guard actions here at home. There was
substantial opposition to the treaty by certain elements in the
administration.
Once it be came clear that the nuclear weapon states were, in fact,
going to approve the treaty arose from a new quarter; India wrapped itself
in the flag of disarmament in order to conceal its even nuclear ambitions.
In the last few months of the CD negotiations, India complained that the
experiments and that it did not commit the nuclear weapon states to a
treaty did not go for enough, that it did not prohibit laboratory
time, bound frame work for nuclear disarmament; that is a series of set
dates by which certain nuclear disarmament goals would be met, leading
to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
India said the nuclear weapon states were practicing nuclear
apartheid, keeping nuclear weapons among a select club and prohibiting
the rest of the world from getting them. This argument has a certain
appeal because there is tremendous resistance to the idea that certain states
should be able to maintain huge arsenals of nuclear weapons while denying
the same weapons to other states.
There is a sense at the CD the nuclear weapon states, particularly
the United States and Russia, practice an arrogance in regards to their own
nuclear arsenals and are moving much too slowly towards the elimination
of these weapons. The United States and the other nuclear weapon states
have pledged under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to take action towards the
elimination of nuclear weapons. Many of the countries in the CD are
unhappy with the progress that is being made.
So India’s arguments, however transparent, had a certain resonance.
Fortunately, most of the countries of the CD saw through these arguments
had opposed India’s efforts to kill the treaty. Unfortunately; the CD is run by consensus not by majority vote. Every member has to agree to a treaty
because it can reported out of the CD. India refused to agree to the treaty
as well as to a report from CD saying that it could not come to an
argument. The CD ended in August 96, without successfully concluding
the treaty or conveying the treaty to the UN.
In an unusual wave, Australia brought the CTBT treaty straight to
the United Nations, overcoming some procedural objections along the way
and rallying a surprisingly strong 127 co-sponsors for their resolutions to
adopt the treaty. The only three countries voting against the treaty were
India, Bhutan, which is a virtual colony of India; and Libya.
There were objections voted along the way. Most important was
India’s objection. It said this treaty would never come into force; they
would never sign this treaty. And Pakistan, which voted in favour of the
treaty, indicated that it would not sign the treaty under existing conditions,
widely interpreted to mean that it would be unable to sign unless India
singed. Security concerns of both India and Pakistan can be addressed
over the next few years that eventually India and Pakistan can be brought
in this treaty..
There have been 2046 nuclear explosions over the last 51 years.
That averages one nuclear explosion every nine days. The U.S. has set off
a nuclear explosion the equivalent of once every 17 days during that time.
it is very likely that there will not be another U.S. nuclear explosion. It is
quite likely that there will never be another explosion in the world –
period.
By signing this treaty, the nuclear weapon states assume the
obligation to do nothing that would obstruct the purpose and object of the
treaty. The Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties obligates states to
uphold treaties they have signed while they await their entry into force.
in space. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty limited underground nuclear
CTBT banned nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, underwater and
weapon tests, including explosions, to 150 kilometers. With the CTBT
negotiating record, it is clear that the treaty bans not only nuclear
Explosion, but any nuclear energy release from a nuclear explosion. It
bans 150 kilotons; it bans one kiloton. It bans 2 kilograms of high-
explosive release, which is the amount of yield from the hydronuclear tests
the United States Conducted during the moratorium from 1958 to 1961. The negotiating record is clear, not even 1 gram of energy released from a
nuclear explosion is permitted.
On the other hand, there are activities that look like nuclear tests
which are permitted. AT least they look like a nuclear test until the big
explosive is set off, but nothing nuclear happens. These so called cold tests
cannot be conducted by the non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT,
but they are permitted to the nuclear-weapon states. In fact, these could be
accomplished as full-scale tests. A gun type nuclear weapon can be loaded
with uranium 238- from which one cannot make a working bombs instead
of uranium 235 and fired. An implosion type weapon could also be loaded
with uranium 235. Every thing goes as it would in a working nuclear
weapon but there is no energy release at all.
Under CTBT, inertial confinement fusion experiments are permitted
to all. These involve buildings full of losers or particles accelerators that
implode a tiny pellet of nuclear material with the aim of reaching
explosions would give may be 1 to 10 tons of energy release, but it is
required very often, more than once a second, in order to mimic an
ordinary power plant. But we are far from actually achieving even the
break even point or the commercial feasibility of inertial confinement
fusion.
Critics on CTBT say that the treaty is couched in feeble and
uninspiring language to cater the interests of the nuclear weapon states. It
should have contained a clear and unambiguous commitment of nuclear
weapon within a time frame.
The text gave rise to the impression that the nuclear weapon states
desired the preservation of the status quo, where in they maintain their
exclusive monopoly of nuclear weaponry. The draft of the CTBT is
seriously flamed.
The United States and its nuclear allies alone passes the required
technology to conduct such tests. India, which has refused to sign the
treaty, has used both arguments in favour and of its refusal. M. Arundhati
Ghash, Indian representative at CD, rejected the draft proposal
ground that “CTBT is an instrument against horizontal proliferation”.
Since India is interested in horizontal proliferation (and this is what
Pakistan’s regional concern is), it took refuge behind an idealistic time
bound ultimate objective of complete nuclear disarmament to avoid signing the CTBT. That is why India is opposed to, Entry into Force provisions
and also rejected a bilateral test ban treaty Pakistan prepared in 1987.
Pakistan has done will to declare that “any step of nuclear escalation
in its region will find a matching response by Pakistan to safeguard its
security… we will not accept unilateral obligations and commitments”.
However by supporting the CTBT in UN Assembly Pakistan has accepted
a moral obligation. It would have been better for Pakistan to abstain in the
voting.
India preached disarmament to others, it practiced the opposite.
India’s two track approach suited both the superpowers for reasons of their
own interests. The Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) had a treaty
relationship with India. The United States preferred to look the other way
for economic and diplomatic reasons.
India exploited its ambivalent policy and nuclear ambiguity during
the cold war environment to acquire the military muscles it derived. It
tested a nuclear device in 1974 and embarked upon getting a multifaceted
missile capability. In the perception of India the possession of the nuclear
weapons and their delivery system was necessary it to claim its share in
the global power cake.
India says that CTBT is not acceptable because it hurts the self-
esteem of the developing countries and would lead to lower economic
growth by doing so.
Pakistan has accepted a moral obligation. It would have been better
for Pakistan to abstain in the voting.