PROBLEMS OF WEALTH, A WEALTH OF PROBLEMS
In 1996, Central Asia became more clearly than ever the object of a new
form of international rivalry, particularly in the renewed regional contest
over Afghanistan. Some analysts referred to this rivalry as a new “Great
Game”, harking back to the term made famous by Rudyard Kipling and
Lord Curzon to describe Russian British rivalry in the area a century ago.
And it is surely true that in the civil war between the Taliban movement
and the forces under the command of Ahmed Shah Massoud, foreign
powers played a role Pakistan’s support to the Taliban was critical. But the sakes today are different; not the reach of distantly based empires, but the
viability of nearby states which recently became independent, and the
control of trade and pipeline routes to connect the region to the world
market. Direct military and administrative control of territory plays less of
a role, and the Central Asians themselves are now major layers as they
were not a century ago.
And yet, certain aspects of the region’s politics are better understood
by reference to the Great Game than to the Cold War. Though nineteenth
century Britain was a constitutional monarchy and Russia an autocracy,
the ideological difference between these systems played little role in their
competition, just as the ideological differences among today’s outside
contenders Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, more distantly, the
United States play a limited role. The collapse of the USSR, with the
subsequent opening of borders, has reinserted Central Asia, so long
captive within a closed Soviet empire’, into its position in the larger region.
including Russia, China, and the Muslim states to the south.
THE ECONOMIC STAKE
The immediate economic stake is access to the world’s largest sources of
oil and natural gas outside of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). Since economic interest rather than ideological
alignment is the main force underlying the rivalry, alignments can be
fluid, Iran and Russia are allied in their approach to Caspian and Central
Asian oil, favoring Iran as the main southerly route, while Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the U.S. favor an alternate route through Afghanistan. While
the Central Asian states have different international orientations, in
particular toward Russia, their attitudes toward the conflict over pipeline
routes are essentially pragmatic; they stand to benefit from any southern
export route and they have not lined up clearly on one side or the other.
In one respect, however, faint echoes of the Cold War can be heard.
As Uzbekistan distances itself from Russia, the U.S. has become an
alternative patron. But as many countries have learned from experience,
dealing with the U. S. involves trying to read contradictory signals.
Security concerns and economic interests become intermingled with
suggestions that a liberal government, mindful of human rights, would get
more respect and help from Washington. American engagement brings
with it some notions of human rights and political liberalization, but an here are the Cold War echoes American assurances give regimes the idea
that they can resume patterns of repression.
The first priority of these newly independent states was to form
national political systems, modes of rule that would establish them as
sovereign actors both domestically and in the international community.
They had to define a new relationship with Russia and the outside world.
Despite nominal independence, these states remained tied to Russia
through the “hard wiring” of decades of investment in infrastructure;
economic relations, transport, communications and security, as well as
education, language, and even personal and family links. At the same
time, the new states eagerly seized on the opportunity to diversify the
external relations that independence afforded.
No aspect of international relations had greater importance than
economics. The collapse of the USSR meant the loss of budgetary
subsidies, which ranged from around 20 percent for energy rich
Turkmenistan and Kazakstan to as high as 50 percent for Tajikistan. The
republics also lost sources of raw materials and markets for their
industries. which produced mostly intermediate goods, especially for the
vast Soviet defense establishment. They hoped that they could make up of
these losses by selling oil and natural gas to foreign markets, and by
attracting foreign investment to revitalize their industries and rebuild their
infrastructure.
Security also posed a major problem. Portions of the former Soviet
military and security forces remained in each of these states. In a clear
demonstration of the sheer newness of the situation in Central Asia,
political leaders, in power and in opposition, could sincerely say that they
did not know whether the Russians should be viewed as their allies or as
the principal threat to their national security. All joined the Common
wealth of Independent States, though Turkmenistan has announced a
doctrine neutrality and therefore declined to participate in CIS joint
military activities, and Uzbekistan has sought to balance Russian power
with a strong relations to the U.S. All but Tajikistan, still torn by a civil
war, also joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace.
Furthermore, as long as they were republics of the USSR, these states
external borders were closed and the region to which they belonged well
defined. Today, the five former Soviet Central Asian republics are not
simply part of the Post Soviet space they are also becoming part of a new, economics their relations with Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are
enlarged area of international interaction. On issues of security and
key. The events in Afghanistan, for instance, were triggered in part by the
Pakistan Iran rivalry, thus leading to major changes in Central Asia’s
security and economies. And not only did Chinese pressure lead to
restrictions on the activities of Uighur activists, but China is quietly
becoming
one of the largest sources of foreign investment and trade in the
region outside of the energy sector,
Finally, the domestic challenge of statehood has meant establishing a
definition of citizenship, defining the role of ethnicity or nationality in a
particular state, and creating new institutions of authority, governance,
and participation. Here, too, different tendencies have emerged, though
strong presidencies with few checks on their powers are a regional trend.
The protection of political rights and civil liberties remains precarious in
the region. Threats of ethnic and religious strife, pressure from
neighboring countries, and the need for stability in times of economic
transformation are often cited as reasons for limits on political activity and
even for violent repression.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
Five years after independence, while certain measures have been taken
toward regional integration, Central Asia is characterized by diversity. A
number of differences are identifiable.
Although Turkic Central Asia has been stable since independence,
civil war in Tajikistan has continued and is closely related to the situation
in Afghanistan. The Tajiks are as populous in northern Afghanistan as in
their own country and speak a variety of Persian (known in Afghanistan as
Dari) as their main language. The Tajik civil war, like the Afghan war,
began as an ideological conflict between those favoring and those opposing
the Soviet system. After the collapse of the USSR, however, both conflicts
changed into multi sided ones among coalitions from different regions with
different foreign backers. The combatants have some what differing
ideologies, but these are less important than regional and ethnic
allegiances. Currently, the government of Tajikistan is controlled by a
faction from Kulab province backed by Russia, which also maintains about
25,000 troops and border guards in the country, ostensibly for
peacekeeping. Uzbekistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan also maintain a
token military presence as part of the border guards or peacekeepers. Uzbekistan played a leading role in bringing the current government to
power but has lost influence to Russia. The main opposition, drawn from
other regions of the country (Garm and the Pamir mountains), includes
democrats, Islamists, and nationalists, and is largely based among the
Tajik refugee population in northern Afghanistan, which receives support
from international Islamist groups.
Within the past year, a third faction emerged in Khujand (Leninabad)
province in the north. This more fully developed region, from which the
Soviet era leaders of Tajikistan came, called on Kulabi fighters to defend
it from the opposition in 1992, but then lost power. Its leaders now
demand a separate seat at the negotiating table and recognition as a power
in their own right. They have support from Uzbekistan.
INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION
Five years after independence, the international orientation of the states of
Central Asia began to diverge and stabilize. Tajikistan remained a Russian
protectorate in all but name, with its security precariously protected by
Russian troops and its budget more dependent on Russian subsides (70
percent, by some accounts) than during Soviet times. The other states, to
varying degrees, had begun to mark their differences with Russia, though
these did not follow the simplistic cultural lines predicted by some in the
immediate aftermath of independence, with Turkic states gravitating
toward Turkey and Tajikistan toward Iran.
Kazakstan, with its large Russian population mostly living in several
northern oblasts adjacent to Siberia, had to maintain close relations with
Russia simply to assure its existence as a state. Turkmenistan, however,
defined itself as a neutral country and hoped to use its vast oil wealth as a
magnet for investment. If declined to participate in CIS military exercises,
distanced itself from Russia’s concern about the taliban, and actively
pursued economic cooperation with Iran. Iran placed great importance on
its relations with Turkmenistan, the only Central Asian country with which
it shares a border and hence key to Iran’s plan to become the major outlet
to the world market for Central Asia’s hydrocarbons and other products.
In April, Iran established the first rail link between Central Asia and the
countries to its south, effectively linking the region to the Persian Gulf.
Uzbekistan, however, went the furthest in demarcating an independent
position. In June, President Islam Karimov visited Washington and me
with President Clinton. Significantly, Karimov then left Washington for meetings with businessmen in Houston and Denver. As a result of this
visit. Uzbekistan turned over to the U. S. detailed information on its
economy, including data previously regarded as soviet state secrets,
leading to a protest from Russia.
The visit highlighted Uzbekistan’s attempts to establish close relations
with the U.S. as a counterbalance to Russia. The establishment of
seemingly permanent Russian bases in Tajikistan and the rise of
nationalism as a force in Russian politics seems to have convinced
Karimov even further that Russia had become a threat to the independence
of the Central Asian states. Lacking a border with Russia or a large ethnic
Russian population, Uzbekistan as the most populous Central Asian state,
could try to use American support to become the dominant regional
power. Karimov had been seeking a visit to Washington for years but had
been denied it on human rights grounds. Apparently, he agreed to make at
least cosmetic improvements in return for the visit, but these appear not to
have been sustained.
The idea of a strategic relationship with Uzbekistan found some
supporters in the U.S., where the Russophilia of the immediate post Soviet
era was wearing thin. Though the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe engaged in some quiet diplomacy in support of
human rights. most states and international organizations praised the
country’s independent path.
ENERGY AND THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
Kazakstan and Turkmenistan are potentially major oil producers
(though not in the same league as the major suppliers in the Persian Gulf).
and Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan also have significant gas
reserves. Under the Soviet system, all the energy systems of the region
were under tight central control, and all pipelines were structured so as to
ensure this control. Control of the energy infrastructure of the former
Soviet Union remains one of Russia’s most important sources of leverage
over the successor states. Even energy rich Kazakstan and Turkmenistan
on Russia for refining and transit and have so far not are dependent
realized the benefits anticipated from economic independence.
In 1996, however, competition over the southern transit routes for
Central Asian energy and trade heated up. As mentioned, Iran established
the first link between its rail network and that of Central Asia (via
Turkmenistan). It also established a free trade zone on the border with Turkmenistan. Specifically in the energy area, it concluded agreements
with both Kazakstan and Turkmenistan on what are known as “swap
deals”. Even with the rail link, it is still prohibitively expensive to
the Persian Gulf, as the proposed pipe line has not been completed, in par
transport Central Asian oil and gas to Iranian ports and oil terminals on
because the U.S. has blocked all international financing for it. Most of
lan’s oil and natural gas resources, however, are located on the Persian
Gulf, in the southwest of the country, and it is expensive to transport them
to consumers in the north. Under the agréements, Kazakstan and
Turkmenistan will deliver oil an gas to Northern Iran, in return for which
Iran will export an equivalent amount of its own production from the south
on behalf of the Central Asian countries. This indirect route constitutes the
first link between Central Asian and Persian Gulf hydrocarbon resources.
