After decades of diplomatic wrangling, breakthroughs have come on
many fronts, both bilateral and multilateral. Not only have Soviets and
now Russians joined Americans in agreements to make massive reductions
in strategic arms, but the overwhelming majority of nations have signed on
to indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Leaders in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have greatly contributed to
the non-proliferation regime by returning thousands of Soviet nuclear
weapons to Russia for safekeeping and elimination, a process to be
completed this fall with the departure of the last few warheads from
Belarus.
The Conventional Foreseen Europe Treaty has ratified and reinforced
the transformation of the military balance on the continent, although the
altered political landscape after the collapse of the Soviet empire will
require nettlesome changes in its provisions. The long sought Chemical
Weapons Convention should enter into force shortly, and, despite India’s
recalcitrance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban enjoys nearly universal
support.
The Clinton administration’s shortcomings are of a different kind. The
president’s team is well staffed with experienced talent in the field of arms
control, and its experts have followed through commendably on the work
of their predecessors. That is especially true of their effort to salvage the
START agreements and protect the non-proliferation regime by persuading
several former Soviet republics to give up their nuclear arsenals.
A NUMBER of present or foreseeable agreements, while by no means
guaranteeing an end to violence between their parties, can enhance
deterrence by impeding surprise attack and increasing the likelihood that
potential victims will have time to bolster their deafness. As a first step to
lengthen the fuse on possible nuclear strikes, the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty removed intermediate-range ballistic and ground launched
cruise missiles from the superpower inventories in Europe. While
submarine launched ballistic missiles remain central to mutual deterrence,
the United States and Russia have undertaken to remove nuclear weapons
from their surface fleets (much to the satisfaction of naval officers, who
considered such weapons unlikely to be unable and a waste of precious
storage space for conventional weapons). Tactical nuclear weapons have
been with drawn from forward deployment in Central Europe, with
NATO retaining only a modest number of air deliverable theater nuclear
weapons to balance residual capabilities in Russia.
In the meantime Moscow and Washington have assured each other
that they have “detargeted” their missiles that is, stopped aim in them at
each other and have lowered the alert status of their strategic forces.
signaling that neither plans an attack. Those changes are sensible and welcome, but they are too easily reversed to have more than symbolic
value. Far more is required in bilateral accords to realize the potential for
strengthening stability in the military balance and the behavior of states.
To offer maximum reassurance that they are turning away from reliance
1 nuclear options and to demonstrate dramatically their commitment to
non-proliferation, the Unite States and Russia should take nuclear
warheads off delivery vehicles and store them under mutual surveillance to
prevent their covert return to active service.
Needless to say, applying the escrow principle to all US and Russian
strategic forces would require early participation in similar arraignments
by Britain, China, and France, the other nuclear powers. Indeed, the
current START agreements, if implemented, carry the two major powers
to force levels at which further progress would depend on engaging those
governments. With strategic deployments ranging from fewer than 300
warheads (China) to slightly more than 500 (France), those countries
should find an intermediate escrow stage more acceptable than a
requirement that they destroy portions of their more meagre forces.
Though slower than the timetable India demands for the nuclear have to
give up their arsenals, escrow would maximize incentives for New Delhi
to modify its hostility to a test ban and accept restraints on the covert
nuclear programs in India, Pakistan, and Israel..
Co-operation between American and Russian military professionals
has come a long way. For some years hence it could well be wise to
encourage the Russian military to retain custody of the nuclear materials
now in warheads. The straightforward way to do that is to leave the
materials in the weapons and subject those weapons to the strictest possible
scrutiny. Strategic escrow is a practical means of preventing dispersal of
the raw materials of nuclear weapons into less trustworthy hand.
In the Navy’s case, giving up sea-launched ballistic missiles, the
pillars of stable deterrence, would be wrenching, but doing so would not
require abandoning its favorite strategic platforms. In the Persian Gulf
War, submarines performed outstandingly as cruise missile launchers, and
they could remain in service for the purpose. In that capacity they would
be valuable complements to the so called “arsenal ships” the navy is now
exploring as advanced technology systems for launching hundreds of
cruise missiles or other weapons. All these considerations suggest that
trends the build down has already set in motion could lead the armed
services to support a ballistic missile ban. CONCERN OVER acquisition of long range missile capabilities by
the congressional interest in rapid erection of strategic deafness,
the rogue regimes of North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya fuels
from those quarters as slender and long term. Yet threats of such uncertai
Intelligence estimates rate the possibility of intercontinental missile threes
the provocative possibility of pre-emptive strikes against incipient mi
nature and timing oblige policy makers to consider all options, Including
development programs, Such preventive action would become both me
workable and more legitimate once Americans and Russians
co-operative approach on banning ballistic missiles,