With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of
Central Asia and there Transcaucasus became a central focus for Russian
foreign policy makers. Given these states ties to the Middle East, Moscow
now tends to view its policy toward Iran through the lens of Theran’s
policies toward Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Of all there states in
the Middle East, perhaps none is more important to Russia than Iran. Not
only is Iran a major player in the region, it is also an important trading
partner and occupies a strategic position on the Persian Gulf.
The Yeltsin regime sees in its relations with Iran three geopolitical
opportunities. First, Iran is an important market for Russian arms and
nuclear technology and is therefore a source of foreign exchange. Second,
sound relations with Tehran give Moscow the opportunity to demonstrate
its diplomatic independence from the United States. Third, Iran looks to
be an ally in Moscow’s efforts to contain and Control Azerbaijan and the
Taliban, and checking Turkish influence. These factors are valued in
Moscow despite concerns about the spread of political Islam and there
possibility that Iran will make good on its offer to provide alternative
transportation links to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. For its part,
Iran regards Russia not only as a source of arms, but also as an important
diplomatic link in its efforts to counter US attempts to isolate it. In
addition, the Rafsanjani regime and Moscow have common policy goals in
both Azerbaijan and Afghanistan.
RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESSES AND
PRIORITIES
In most democratic countries, domestic politics play a significant role
in foreign policy. In Russia, a country that only became democratic at the
end of 1991, domestic politics have also become central to Russian foreign
policy making. The impact of domestic politics on Russian policy toward
the Middle East is clearly illustrated by the shift from a strong pro-western
stance in 1992 to a more nationalist one in 1997, a process punctuated by
the January 1996 replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister. Throughout this period, Yeltsin’s foreign policy has
reflected the demands of Russian domestic politics. Particularly after the
December 1993 elections, instead of openly confronting the Duma, Yeltsin
chose to adapt to its highly nationalistic foreign policy agenda, a pattern of
behavior he was to repeat after the December 1995 Duma elections. This
strategy, in part, helped him to be re-elected in 1996.
STAGE ONE: A PRO-AMERICAN APPROACH
During most of 1992, Russian foreign policy was clearly oriented in a
pro-American Direction. Russia joined in enforcing sanctions against Iraq
Libya, and enthusiastically supported the Arab-Israeli peace process. In
by dispatching two warships to the Persian Gulf, backed sanctions against
addition, Kozyrev took the lead in calling for normal diplomatic relations
with there newly independent states, where 25 million Russians now live.
Only in the case of arms sales to Iran did Russia take a position markedly
different from that of the United States.
By December 1992, however, Yeltsin’s control over foreign policy
I was being challenged in the Duma, where three main groups vied for
power. On the left was a group of legislators who supported Yeltsin’s
economic reforms. In particular, this group favored strengthening ties with
Israel, supporting sanctions against Iraq, and cooperating with the
countries of the “near abroad”. In the center was a group of legislators
who advocated the so-called “Eurasian” approach to foreign policy. They
believed Russia should not focus exclusively on the United States and
Europe, but called for good ties with all of the Middle East and China.
While this group also wanted much closer ties with the “near abroad”, it
wanted Russia to rank first among equals. On domestic policy, although
still in favor of economic reform, the Eurasianists advocated a far slower
an alliance of privatization process. Finally, on the right was
ultranationalists and old guard communists. Through differing on
economic policy, they all wanted a powerful, highly centralized Russia
that would actively protect Russians living in there “near abroad”, act like
a major world power, adopt a confrontational approach toward the United
States and Israel in their view Russia’s main enemies and renew close ties
with Moscow’s former Middle East allies such as Iraq. This alliance of
communists and ultranationalists also advocated the re-establishment
Moscow’s domination over the “near abroad”. STAGE TWO: A MOVE TO THERE CENTER
With Duma opposition to his policies growing, Yeltsin fired Prime
the centrist Viktor Chernomyrdin in December 1992. One month later,
Minister Yegor Gaidar, a western style reformer, and replaced him with
Yeltsin openly broke with Washington by criticizing the US bombing of
submarines and took a stronger position on there protection of Russian in
Iraq. During 1993, he also increased arms sales to Iran including
the “near abroad”, suggesting that Russia should have “special powers as
guarantor of peace and stability there”. Moscow also intervened more
openly in conflicts in the Transcaucasus (there Abkhaz Georgian and
Azerbaijan Armenian wars) and in the Tajik civil war.
Despite these nationalistic moves, Yeltsin’s conflict with the
legislative branch continued, culminating in armed confrontation after he
sought to dissolve the Duma in late September 1993. Yeltsin chose
cooperation instead of confrontation. This led to the third stage in his
foreign policy.
STAGE THREE: MOVING TOWARD THE RIGHT 1994-95
One of the indicators of the right ward turn in Middle East policy was
the steady rapprochement between Russia and Iraq. Government officials
from both sides were now visiting each other regularly, and by the
summer of 1994, Russian officials had begun to call for the lifting of UN
sanctions against Iraq. In addition, Russia increased its arms sales to Iran
during this period and for the first time, took a position independent of the
US in the Arab Israeli conflict. As far as the “near abroad” was
concerned, Russia stepped up its efforts to assert control, limiting the
amount of oil it would permit Kazakstan to send through Russian pipelines
while undermining Azerbaijan’s efforts to develop its oil exporting
facilities and maintain its economic independence. Perhaps the strongest
signal of Yeltsin’s turn to the right was his invasion of Chechnya in
December 1994. This ill fated decision, possibly aimed at securing the
Baku Grozny oil pipeline, was an economic and military disaster, which
lasted almost two years and led to the death of more than 30,000 civilians.
Russia’s defeat demonstrated just how weak the country had become.
As far to the right as Yeltsin had moved in 1994 he was to move still
further in 1995. Under his direction, Russia went ahead with the sale of
nuclear reactors to Iran in the face of bitter American criticism. Yeltsin
also stepped up Russia’s efforts to lift the sanctions against Iraq. In the “near abroad,” Russia adopted its toughest position to date. Not only did
military hardware in southern Russia, he also signed an edict urging
Yeltsin call for the renegotiation of conventional weapons limitations on
policy toward Moscow and proposed stationing of Russian border guard
Russia to ensure that the former Soviet republics pursue a “friendly”
troops in these states.
Despite this turn to the right, Yeltsin suffered a major defeat in the
December 1995 Duma elections, a development that led him to fire a most
all of his reformist and overtly pro western government officials such as
Kozyrev, and replace them with conservatives or Russian nationalists like
election campaign which sought to convince the Russian electorate that he
Yevgenii Primakov. These actions set the stage for Yeltsin’s Presidential
I was as nationalist and faithful to Russian interests as his main rival,
communist leader Gennady Zuganov.
STAGE FOUR: THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND
THEIR AFTERMATH
During the election campaign, Yeltsin adopted, with the help of ex-
denounced NATO expansion and sought increased control over the “near
general Aleksandr Lebed, a nationalistic position in which he both
abroad”. After his election, however, he fell ill for many months. When
Yeltsin returned to the Kremlin in March 1997, he appeared to change
direction once again, appointing reformers Anatolii Chubais and Boris
Nemtsov to high positions in his government and firing hard-line foreign
policy adviser, Dmitrii Rurikov. The initial effect of these changes
expansion, a watering down of the planned union with Belarus, and a
appeared to be a moderation of Russian opposition toward NATO
renewed effort to improve relations with the “near abroad,” with Yeltsin
promising to make a long delayed visit to Ukraine and extraditing to
Azerbaijani leader Haidar Aliyev.
Nonetheless, as in 1992, when Russia pursued a policy of cooperation
Moscow’s policy toward Iran with NATO and the “near abroad,
appeared to be exempt from Moscow’s overall policy reorientation.
Indeed, the day after a German court had accused the Iranian leadership of
assassinating four Iranian Kurdish exiles, Boris Yeltsin warmly welcomed
Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, the Iranian speaker of Parliament and most likely
successor to Iranian Président Hashemi Rafsanjani: “We have good,
positive cooperation with Iran, which show a tendency to grow,” It remains to be seen whether the government changes this past spring, wil
lead to a real change in Russia’s foreign policy or whether it is a brief
aberration in the nationalist trends of 1993-96.
DISCORDANT VOICES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY.
MAKING
While Yeltsin has set the overall tone for Russian foreign policy
toward Iran as well as toward other Middle East countries, there have
been assertive in Russian policy toward the Middle East and the “near
been a number of other autonomous or semi autonomous actors that have
abroad.” This complicates Russian foreign Policy making, particularly
Foreign Ministry. While this was one of the reasons Kozyrev was replaced
when a direct clash occurs between the independent actors and the Russian
by Primakov in January 1996, it is not yet clear that Primakov has
managed to assert complete dominance over the foreign policy making
process in Moscow.
Perhaps the leading example of independent foreign policy making in
Russia is Lukoil. Owned in part by the American oil company ARCO,
Lukoil in 1994 came into direct conflict with the Foreign Ministry’s policy
which claimed that none of the five Caspian Sea littoral states (Russia,
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan) could act independently
in developing there oil resources in the Caspian Sea. However, when
Lukoil signed an agreement with the Azerbaijan International Operating
Company to develop oil resources in the Caspian Sea, it explicitly
recognized Azerbaijan’s right to extract oil in its sector of the Caspian. In
mid March 1996, Lukoil joined a US-led international consortium to build
an oil pipeline from Kazakstan’s Tengiz oil fields to the Russian port of
Novorossisk. Kazakstan, like Azerbaijan, claims the right to extract oil
from its sector of the Caspian Sea independently, but until March 1996,
Almaty’s efforts to market its oil was stymied by Russian limits on oil
shipments through Russian pipelines. Indeed, in February 1996, Primakov
had reportedly visited Kazakstan in an unsuccessful effort to get it to
accept Russia’s position on Caspian sea Oil. While Russia will still have
influence over oil shipments running through Russian territory, the
presence of major foreign contractors makes interference with Kazak oil
shipments less likely. Thus, Kazakstan enjoys some freedom of action vis-
a-vis Russia. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN IRANIAN RELATIONS
The rapprochement between Russia and Iran began in the latter part of
the Gorbachev era. After supporting first Iran and then Iraq during the
Iran Iraq war, Gorbachev tilted toward Iran after July 1987. There
relationship between the two countries was solidified in June 1989 with
Rafsanjani’s visit to Moscow, where a number of major agreements,
including one on military cooperation, were signed. The military
from Moscow, including MIG-29s and SU-24s. At a time when there
agreement permitted Iran to purchase highly sophisticated military aircraft
Iranian air force had been badly eroded by the US refusal to supply spare
parts or replace aircraft and the 8 year war with Iraq, the Soviet military
equipment was desperately needed.
Iran’s military dependence on Moscow grew after the 1990-91 Gulf
War. As a result of Sadam Hussein’s failed gamble, the United States
became the primary military power in the Persian Gulf, entering into
. defensive agreements with a number of the GCC states, including
propositioning arrangements for US military equipment. Saudi Arabia
Iran’s most important Islamic challenger, acquired massive amounts of US
weaponry. Although Iraq, still an enemy of Iran, was badly damaged by
the war, its petroleum reserves held out the possibility of economic and
military recovery once the UN sanctions were lifted. To Iran’s northeast,
the war in Afghanistan continued despite the Soviet military withdrawal,
with the Iranian backed Shi’a forces often getting the worst of there
fighting. Finally, to the north, there collapse of the Soviet Union held both
opportunity and danger. The opportunity came in there form of six newly
independent Muslim states Azerbaijan, and Kazakstan where Iran might
exercise influence. But Azerbaijan’s Popular Front, which ruled the
country from June 1992 to June 1993, called for the unification of Iranian
Azerbaijan with newly independent ex-Soviet Azerbaijan. Such a
development would mean the partitioning of Iran. Iran faces a similar.
although far less serious, problem with Turkmenistan. if Turkmenista
were to become a wealthy and powerful state through the development of
its natural gas resources, it could present an irredentist attraction to the
Turkmens living in northeastern Iran.
Given Iran’s need for sophisticated arms, President Rafsanjani has
been careful not to alienate either the Soviet Union or Russia. Thus, whe
Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union in Novembe
1991, Iran unlike Turkey, did not recognize its independence
until after the USSR formally collapsed. Similarly, despite occasional rhetoric from
officials, Rafasanjani has seen to it that Iran keeps a relatively low
profile in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, emphasizing cultural and economic
ties rather than Islam as the center piece of their relations. Rafsanjani’s
pragmatism stemmed from there enervation of Islamic traditions in Central
Asia after more than seventy years of Soviet rule, the secular orientation
of the Muslim leaders in the newly independent states, and the low
chances for an Iranian style Islamic revolution. However, some skeptics
have argued that Iran is simply waiting for mosques to be built and Islam
e before it tries to foster Islamic revolutions. Nonetheless, there Russian leadership saw Iran as acting very responsibly in both Central
Asia and Transcaucasus, and this responsibility encouraged Russia to
continue supplying Iran with modern weaponry despite strong protests
from the United States. Iran’s low key reaction toward Chechnyan rebels
and Russia’s pro-Serbian policy in Bosnia helped cement relations.
As noted above, even during Yeltsin’s honeymoon year with the
United States, Moscow and Washington clashed over Russian the war
raging in Chechnya and the United States pushing for the NATO
expansion, Russian nationalists looked to a closer relationship with Iran as
a counter balance.
For Russia, Iran is an excellent arms market, a country where Russia
can demonstrate its role in world affairs, and a tactical ally in curbing
Azerbaijan and containing the Taliban. At a time when Russia is militarily
weak and in serious financial crisis, Iran can help Russia defuse crises,
such as Tajikistan, and prevent the United States from dominating the
Persian Gulf. For Iran, Russia is a secure source of arms, a diplomatic
ally against US attempts to isolate it, and a tactical ally in curbing both the
aspirations of Azerbaijan and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
One can, however, foresee limits to the relationship. First, the
weakness of the Iranian economy may well constrict its ability to purchase
both military and civilian goods from Russia. Second, should Iran ever
acquire the means of providing extensive oil and natural gas pipelines to
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, Russia’s hold over the two regions
would be weakened. Similarly, as Iran develops its trade with Russian
provinces such as Daghestan, centrifugal forces within the Russian
Federation may be reinforced. In sum, the current Russian Iranian
relationship is of considerable tactical importance to both countries. How
får it can be preserved into the future is an open question.
